NEW DELHI: The world watched nervously as two nuclear-armed rivals drew toward a possibly disastrous war during India’s and Pakistan’s last military encounter in 2019. Stopped short of the nuclear threshold, that conflict featured air strikes, retaliatory raids, and a captured pilot. The danger of escalation might be much more than previously, though, if tensions once again tilt toward full war—as recent events indicate. What for? Their leaderships have become more forceful since both armies have greatly modernised their weaponry and the regional geopolitical scene has been reshaped by China’s and the United States’ rival ambitions.
After a fatal assault on domestic visitors in Indian-administered Kashmir last month, India blamed Pakistan. Raising concerns of another restricted military operation across the Line of Control, Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised to punish the backers of the attack “beyond their imagination.” Though claiming no participation, Pakistan has threatened to retaliate if aimed.
The 2019 standoff came after the Pulwama suicide bombing and resulted in Indian air raids deep into Pakistani land, allegedly aiming at terrorist sites. In a time of great drama, Pakistan shot down an Indian MiG-21 and launched its own air operation. Though the incident finished without more escalation, it underlined how quickly a localised attack can escalate into a larger conflict.
Fighting three wars—1948, 1965, and 1971—and many skirmishes largely over Kashmir, a region both claim, India and Pakistan have fought. Acquiring nuclear weapons in the late 1990s changed the character of their conflict, hence severely restricting full-scale battle. Nuclear deterrence is still in place, but the area for conventional escalation has grown and is now more deadly.
Frank O’Donnell, a non-resident fellow at the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center in Washington, observes, “In 2019, both sides showed restraint at the nuclear threshold, but the space for conventional escalation remains dangerously open.” Decision-makers’ risk appetite has grown. But even little interactions might spiral without well defined mutual red lines.
India, especially, has tried to fix flaws shown during the 2019 war. At the time, old Russian MiGs were a major reliance for the Indian Air Force. Modi eventually regretted the lack of Rafale fighters, implying the result might have been different. India has since included 36 French-made Rafale fighters with Meteor beyond-visual-range missiles. Indian Navy has more on order.
From its closest friend, Pakistan has reacted by strengthening its strategic relationship with China and purchasing more than 20 J-10C fighter planes equipped with PL-15 missiles. Muhammad Faisal, a South Asia security researcher at the University of Technology Sydney, claims “This is no longer an asymmetric air contest.” Both sides now have fourth-generation systems with attack and counter-strike capacity.
Both sides have also strengthened their air defences. While Pakistan has bought China’s HQ-9—based on the Russian S-300, India has acquired the battle-tested Russian S-400 system. Both sides of the border are internalising the lessons of 2019.
Anil Golani, former air vice marshal in the Indian Air Force and now director general of the Centre for Air Power Studies in Delhi, says, “Most certainly in some respects we are better off [than in 2019].” Though in my own opinion, both India and Pakistan are not seeking an all-out war despite the great demand for action in the nation.
But war now includes more than simply fighter planes. Both nations are fast developing in unmanned combat. India has bought Israeli Heron Mark 2 drones and is looking for U.S.-made Predator drones. Pakistan has included the more sophisticated Akinci drone and the Turkish Bayraktar TB2—notably employed by Ukraine in its conflict with Russia.
Drone swarms or precise missile strikes might just as readily replace a manned air raid today. These changes make the calculation of escalation more difficult. Neither side would endanger a pilot being shot down needlessly. Many people now view a ground-launched missile strike or drone as the first move in any constrained engagement.
Declaring its ability to “safeguard national security against any aggression,” Pakistan’s military, expressing readiness in the face of renewed tensions, recently test-fired a surface-to-surface ballistic missile with a range of 450 km. The nation also keeps a variety of medium- and short-range missiles. Among India’s weapons are the intercontinental Agni missile family and the supersonic BrahMos.
With many missile attacks allegedly under consideration before U.S. intervention helped de-escalate, the 2019 conflict almost spiralled into uncontrolled escalation. Kaiser Tufail, a retired Pakistani fighter pilot, claims “India failed to create deterrence in 2019.” “This time it might want a more penetrating hit, but that has its own dangers. Going beyond what we seen in 2019 is quite dangerous. Nuclear-armed nations fighting it out is quite hazardous.
Any fresh India-Pakistan war today, however, would not occur in isolation. It would play out under the long shadows of China and the United States—two world powers whose geopolitical rivalry is now influencing security decisions in South Asia and the larger Global South.
Through the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Beijing is not only Pakistan’s biggest arms supplier but also a long-term economic partner. The backbone of Pakistan’s conventional military capacity is now Chinese weapons, radar systems, drones, and missiles. A war in which its equipment is pitted against sophisticated Western systems—like Rafale fighters, Meteor missiles, and Israeli drones—gives China a chance to evaluate the battlefield performance of its military sector.
Faisal warns that “this might become a proxy war between Chinese and Western military technology.” “For India, the dilemma is not just tactical but strategic—how many air squadrons to commit against Pakistan while keeping an eye on the Line of Actual Control with China.”
India, on the other hand, is growing more in line with the United States and its allies. Part of the Quad (with the U.S., Japan, and Australia), it has inked basic defence pacts with Washington enabling real-time intelligence-sharing and interoperability. India is also buying U.S. weapon systems, including the P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft and Predator drones.
This changing affiliation implies that Washington is not anymore an impartial mediator. Though in today’s multipolar world it has to consider its Indo-Pacific policy, its competition with China, and its South Asia interests more carefully. A former Indian official observes, “The U.S. has gone from being a neutral mediator to a strategic stakeholder.” “That changes the diplomatic landscape.”
The changing India-U.S. axis and the long-standing China-Pakistan partnership are both components of a larger geopolitical realignment in the Global South. A pragmatic polycentrism is replacing the conventional non-aligned attitude. Though claiming leadership in G20 and the Global South Summit, India is developing varied relationships throughout Africa, ASEAN, and Latin America. Once a front partner in the U.S.-led war on terror, Pakistan is now using Gulf investment and Chinese military assistance to strategically realign.
Neither India nor Pakistan presently depends just on one bloc for armaments. Their purchases come from Turkey, Israel, the West, China, Russia. This shows a new multipolar military economy reflecting the more general political reorganization of the Global South. South Asia’s battlefield might become a test case for new doctrines, technology, and deterrence measures as nations like Brazil, Indonesia, and Nigeria also embrace a multi-aligned posture.
In the words of one retired Pakistani commander, “The battlefield today is also a showroom. Everyone is looking to see whose technology works, whose ideology maintains, and whose deterrence acts.”
Yet, for all this modernization, the basic threat stays the same: a misstep, a drone malfunction, or a misread political signal may spin out of hand. Higher-tech armies lead to quicker escalation and tighter de-escalation deadlines. In such an unstable climate, even small conflicts run the danger of starting a far bigger conflagration.
General Pervez Musharraf once cautioned during the 2001–2002 stalemate, “We may not want war, but we must be prepared for one.” Made in the wake of 9/11, the remark now resonates with more urgency in a more fractured, militarised, and unstable society.
War’s effects won’t be limited to the subcontinent if it does come again; they will resonate throughout a Global South still searching for its role in a world between Washington and Beijing, sovereignty and interdependence, forbearance and retribution.
– Dr. Shahid Siddiqui; Follow via X @shahidsiddiqui
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